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Invisible Children: Advocacy and Accidental Viral Marketing 
Jeff Aulgur and Ruth Bernstein 
 
In March 2003, Jason Russell, Laren Poole, and Bobby Bailey, three young amateur 
documentary filmmakers, traveled to Africa in search of a story. The trip resulted in the founding 
of Invisible Children, Inc. (IC), a nonprofit organization with a mission to increase public 
awareness of the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Central Africa, and its 
leader, Joseph Kony. In 2004, the three filmmakers released the documentary film Invisible 
Children: Rough Cut. The trio screened viewings of the movie around the world to raise 
awareness of the LRA’s practices in the hopes that Joseph Kony would be brought to justice 
(NCDD, 2008; Schwartz, 2014). 
In 2006, Invisible Children facilitated Global Night Commute, a reported 125 city event 
which saw 80,000 youth sleeping in city centers to raise awareness of, and solidarity with, 
children in Uganda who walked at night to avoid capture by the LRA (Invisible Children, n.d.; 
Schwartz, 2014). Annual revenues quickly increased for Invisible Children.  Between 2008 and 
2011, the group held steady with yearly income between eight and $13 million (Schwartz, 2014). 
In March 2012, Invisible Children released a 30-minute film that described the LRA’s 
exploits and promoted the capture of  Joseph Kony.  The organization initially posted the film to 
Vimeo where it garnered limited interest.  Once posted to YouTube on Monday, March 5, the 
film went viral (Wilson, 2012) and three days later, the viewership later exceeded 40 million 
views. Over 100 million people viewed the film in six days as it became the fastest-growing viral 
video at that time,. The video had an immense reaction among high school and university 
students in the United States.  A Pew poll conducted shortly after the release of the film indicated 
that 58% of young adults in the U.S. were aware of the video (Schwartz, 2014).  
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The overwhelming response to Kony 2012 came with a personal cost to co-founder Jason 
Russell.  On March 15, 2012, Russell was arrested and detained for psychiatric evaluation after 
appearing naked during a public meltdown on a San Diego street (Harris, 2012).  TMZ 
broadcasted a video of Russell’s episode, which also went viral.  
The Kony 2012 video received immediate scrutiny, including accusations of 
exaggeration, incomplete fact checking, inconsistent political statements, inappropriate support 
for the military, and an overemphasis on costs at the expense of charitable giving (Marketing 
Week, 3/15/2012).  When the film was released, Joseph Kony had not been in Uganda for six 
years, and the membership of the LRA was not 30,000, but in the hundreds (Curtis & McCarthy, 
2012; Keating, 2012).  The 30,000-membership figure represented the number of children 
abducted by the LRA over a 30-year period. Foreign Affairs criticized the organization before 
the film’s release for manipulating the facts and emphasizing the LRA’s use of innocent children 
for its gain (Schomerus, Allen, & Vlassenroot, 2011).  
Public documents indicated that in 2011, Invisible Children spent 32% of its $8.6 million 
in revenues on direct programs, with the remainder supporting staff salaries, travel, and film 
production (Oyston, 2012; Ritson, 2012).  At the time of the video’s release, Charity Navigator 
awarded IC only two of four stars for transparency and accountability, primarily for the lack of 
an external audit (Wilson, 2012).   Interestingly, within Uganda, the non-governmental 
organizations felt Kony was no longer a relevant concern. The NGOs and the government, 
instead, were working a basic infrastructure needs such as rebuilding, education, sanitation and 
public health. (Curtis and McCarthy, 2012). 
Before the release of Kony 2012, Invisible Children received the majority of its funding 
from the sales of T-shirts, DVDs, and modest donations from presentations to high schools and 
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colleges in the United States. The events became problematic for IC after the film’s release, as 
audiences’ increasingly challenged the veracity of the film and Invisible Children’s use of 
monies raised (Titeca & Sebastian, 2014). In 2013, the organization’s total revenue dropped to 
$5.5 million, and by 2015 it struggled to raise $300,000 to fund targeted advocacy work in 
Washington, D.C. (Schwartz, 2014).  
By 2017, Invisible Children transformed its effort against the LRA from awareness to 
action. Invisible Children currently supplies civilians with high-frequency radios to collaborate 
“closely with the U.S. Africa Command the Uganda People’s Defense Forces, and the United 
Nations peacekeepers, all of whom rely on the radio program’s data in the hunt for Kony” 
(Gauvey Herbert, 2017, para. 4). 
Discussion Questions:  
 
1. What are the key lessons around governance of this case study? 
a. What was the responsibility of the Board of directors in this case?  
2. What went wrong? Where did the fault lie?  
a. Was it a failure of imagination, of planning and implementation, of management, of 
leadership, or accountability? 
3. What is the purpose of Invisible Children? Is advocacy its primary mission or is it secondary, 
done to support mission achievement? What are the social realities or problems that the 
organization seeks to solve, alleviate, or otherwise address? Were the strategies adopted 
successful in addressing those issues? If not, what should have been done?  
4. What was the impact of advocacy activities on achieving or supporting the mission?  
a. Does it appear that the organization had an advocacy or public policy strategy?  
b. Did engaging in advocacy positively or negatively impact the ability of Invisible Children 
to fundraise? 
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c. Could you argue that some of the advocacy activities were more focused on marketing or 
public outreach? 
d. Did Invisible Children succeed or fail in terms of using advocacy to achieve their goals? 
5. What were the advantages of using social media? Disadvantages? 
6. What lessons can be learned from this case that can be applied to other nonprofit organizations? 
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